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Route redistribution (RR) is becoming a critical tool in en-
terprise network operations. Like BGP, RR is prone to
configuration errors, which may result in severe instabili-
ties such as permanent routing loops and oscillations. In
response, router vendors have put forth a set of recommen-
dations on how to configure RR. However, the proposed
guidelines are mainly derived from anecdotal experience and
based on a limited range of parameters. Having not been
subjected to systematic validation, their general effective-
ness for preventing routing instabilities is largely unknown.
This paper shows that the vendor recommendations do not
completely eliminate routing instabilities and have severe
limitations in terms of domain backup. It then presents
a set of new guidelines with provable properties assuring
safety, robustness, reachability, and domain backup. Con-
figurations based on these guidelines allow routing domains
of a network to safely exchange information and back up
each other, thus increasing the robustness of the network
against failures.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Network Operations]: Network Management; C.2.2
[Network Protocols]: Routing Protocols
Keywords
Router configuration, route redistribution, routing loop, route
oscillations
1. INTRODUCTION
Route redistribution is a growing practice for enterprise
networks. Company mergers, multi-vendor environments,
and business expansions all contribute to the existence of
multiple routing domains or routing instances [10] within
corporate networks. Each routing instance consists of a
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group of routers using the same protocol to exchange reach-
ability information. By default routing instances do not
share routing information. Operators must explicitly con-
figure border routers (e.g., routers D and E in the network
shown in Figure 1) to propagate routes across routing pro-
tocol boundaries, a process known as route redistribution
(RR) [3].
RR originated as a work-around put in by router vendors
to address operators’ needs. There is no RFC or open stan-
dards on its functionality. Besides expanding reachability,
RR was also motivated by a need for domain backup. A
RR configuration provides domain backup if reachability in
the network is maintained, as much as the physical topology
allows, even though parts of some routing instances expe-
rience link or router failures. For example, consider the
network depicted in Figure 1. If link B-C fails, the RIP do-
main is partitioned into two parts without RR, despite the
existence of a physical path from C to B via the OSPF do-
main. Configuring RR at the two border routers can make
such cross-domain backup paths available to routers in both
domains.
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) provides an alternative
to RR for integrating the routing instances. RR is often
considered preferable to BGP for several reasons. First,
BGP requires a full mesh and therefore, every router (in-
cluding the internal ones) needs to run BGP. Instead, RR
only requires configuration at the border routers. One could
redistribute the BGP routes into the IGP to avoid the full-
mesh, but such an approach still relies on RR. Second, stud-
ies have exposed routing instabilities that can result from
conflicting BGP policies [6]. Even though [5] showed that
existing commercial relationships between Autonomous Sys-
tems (customer, provider, peer) impose a partial order on
the routes and prevent these instabilities, such relationships
do not exist among the routing instances of many enterprise
networks. Finally, BGP does not support domain backup in
the event of network partitions.
However, RR can be as hard to configure correctly as
BGP, as will be explained in Section 2. Misconfigurations of
RR can easily result in severe instabilities, including persis-
tent routing loops and permanent route oscillations [3], [2], [9].
Vendors try to mitigate the problems by publishing tem-
plates for configuring RR and pointing out common pitfalls
of RR configurations through simple examples.
In this paper, we first show that these templates have
flaws and the examples have limitations. Then, inspired by
the work presented in [5] toward developing guidelines for









Figure 1: Example enterprise network consisting of
two routing domains or routing instances. By de-
fault, routers in the RIP domain do not have visi-
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Figure 2: Routing instances and routing processes.
our prior work which developed the first formal model for
evaluating the safety of RR configurations [9], we establish
guidelines or conditions for configuring RR so that the con-
figuration crafted following the guidelines is free of instabili-
ties and satisfies the reachability and domain backup objec-
tives.
2. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF RR
This section presents a brief overview of the most relevant
aspects of RR configuration and introduces some of the no-
tations we use. More detailed background information can
be found in [9].
A router running multiple routing protocols instantiates a
separate routing process for each protocol. For example, the
network in Figure 1 comprises two routing instances, and
as illustrated in Figure 2, routers D and E each runs two
routing processes: one for RIP and the other for OSPF. In
the rest of the paper, we identify a router by a capital letter
and a routing instance by an integer id that is unique within
a network. We use <router id>.<routing instance id> to
name a routing process, e.g., E.2 for the OSPF routing pro-
cess on router E in the example network.
A router running multiple processes may receive several
routes to one destination prefix at the same time and need
to select one of them to install in its Forwarding Information
Base (FIB). To add flexibility to the selection logic, router
vendors have introduced a configurable integer parameter
per routing process, called administrative distance (AD), to
aid the ranking of multiple routes to the same destination [4].
Specifically, a route offered by a routing process inherits
the AD value of the routing process and the route with the
lowest AD value is selected and added to the FIB. When not
explicitly configured, the AD of a routing process defaults
to a protocol-specific value: e.g, 110 for OSPF and 120 for
RIP as shown in Figure 2. Likewise, each router’s built-in
Local RIB (Route Information Base) has default AD values
of 0 and 1 respectively for the connected subnets and static
routes.
RR can be used to propagate routes across routing pro-
cesses on the same router. For example, a RR is configured
to enable E.1 to export routes to E.2 in the example net-
work, as illustrated by an arrowed dash line in Figure 2.
It is important to note two basic operational characteristics
of RR. First, a RR configuration does not mean exporting
all routes from the source process (e.g., E.1) to the target
process (e.g., E.2); only those routes that are installed in
the FIB, which we term active routes of the source process,
are eligible for redistribution. Second, RR does not directly
impact route selection at the local router; a RR target pro-
cess will not offer imported routes to the FIB. For example,
we assume a route redistributed from E.1 into E.2. Even
though E.2 has a lower AD value (110 vs. 120), the route
from E.1 continues to be the active one in the FIB. How-
ever, since it is possible (and quite often) that a RR target
process (e.g., E.2) disseminates imported routes to other
routers (e.g., H) in the same routing instance, the combina-
tion of multiple RR configurations, while each is local to a
particular router, can have a profound impact on how FIBs
are populated across the network.
The interplay between the route selection logic working
with routing processes and the RR logic with respect to
routing instances introduces tremendous modeling complex-
ity for inferring network wide FIB contents from given per-
router RR configurations. In [9], we show that even assum-
ing that the RR configurations lead to convergence, deter-
mining if the final routing state is cycle free is NP-hard. On
one hand, we observe that a lot of the modeling complexity
is due to the total freedom of choosing AD values permitted
by the current practice. There are even configuration op-
tions to override, on a per destination prefix basis, the AD
value of a route learned within the same routing instance.
For example, while the AD of E.2 is 110, a route received
from a peer OSPF process of E.2 may be configured to have
an AD value different from 110, say 90. On the other hand,
we realize it may be possible to take advantage of such flex-
ibility and create guidelines on AD assignment to eliminate
routing instabilities.
The following sections discuss guidelines for setting AD
values so the resulting set of RR configurations is safe while
meeting robustness, reachability and domain backup require-
ments. We say that a set of RR configurations is safe when
it always converges to a cycle-free state. We say a set of RR
configuration is robust if the redistributions remain safe in
the event of network failures. Without loss of generality, all
discussions are with respect to a single destination prefix,
denoted by P , unless noted otherwise.
3. ANALYSIS OF VENDOR DOCUMENTS
Vendors have proposed a number of templates and meth-




















Figure 3: Example of a network where vendors’
guidelines do not guarantee safety. A prefix P is
originated by instance 1. Router A runs three pro-
cesses and redistributes from A.1 into A.2. Router B
redistributes from B.2 into B.3.
Although the methods differ on the implementation means
(e.g., some rely on access-lists while others utilize tags or
keywords), they all achieve the same goal stipulated by the
following vendors’ guideline [3]:
Vendors Guideline: Do not redistribute a route originally
received from a routing process back into that routing process.
This guideline is intended to prevent the formation of
routing loops and route oscillations. To illustrate its ra-
tionale, we assume a prefix originated by routing instance
1 in Figure 2. If E redistributes from E.1 into E.2 and D
redistributes from D.2 into D.1, a routing loop may arise
between routing instances 1 and 2. Also, if both redistribu-
tions from 1 into 2 and from 2 into 1 are enabled at D and
E, permanent route oscillations can happen [2].
However, this principle is not sufficient to guarantee safety.
Configurations compliant with this suggested principle can
still be vulnerable to instabilities. Figure 3 provides such an
example. The depicted configuration complies with the ven-
dors’ guideline since routes to P are redistributed only from
1 into 2 (at A), and from 2 into 3 (at B). However, as illus-
trated in Figure 4, such configuration results in permanent
route oscillations. We implemented a similar topology and
observed a permanent route flap. To represent the propaga-
tion of the routes in the network and the sequence of routing
states observed, we introduce the following notion of time
based on variable t. We initialize t to 1 to at the initial state,
and increment t by one whenever the system transitions to
a different state. In addition, we color a routing instance in
white when it does not have a route to the destination, and
in blue shade when it does. The redistributions are repre-
sented by arrows between the routing processes. An arrow is
dashed when the redistribution is configured but not active.
An arrow is solid when the redistribution is active – i.e., the
source process’s route to P is selected by the FIB. Finally,
at each router, the selected routing process is represented by
a double line border (e.g., at t=2, A.1 is the selected process
for destination P at router A).
t=1 We assume a prefix P originated by instance 1.
t=2 A learns a route through A.1 and redistributes the
route from A.1 into A.2.
t=3 B receives the route through B.2, installs it in its FIB


















































































































Figure 4: Illustration of a permanent route flap in
the network of Figure 3
t=4 A receives two routes to the destination: one from A.1
and another one from A.3. Because A.3 has a lower
AD, A.3 becomes the selected routing process. Conse-
quently, A stops redistributing from A.1 into A.2.
t=5 Because A stopped redistributing from A.1 into A.2,
B no longer receives any announcement. B removes
the route and stops announcing it into B.3.
t=6 Consequently, A.3 no longer receives a route to the des-
tination either. We note that this state is identical to
the one at t=2, and consequently we have a permanent
route oscillation.
In addition to the lack of safety guarantees, because the
guideline prevents the re-injection of a route into a rout-
ing instance that initially announced the route, none of the
existing methods supports domain backup in the event of
network partitions. To illustrate the issue, we consider the
topology in Figure 1. We assume that the link B-C fails. As
a consequence, the RIP domain is divided into two partitions
({A, B, D} and {C, E}). While there exists a physical path
for C to reach B (e.g., through path C-E-F -D-A-B), current
methods do not allow it. It is important to note that some
of the vendor solutions claim to provide domain backup.
However, the vendors’ definition of “domain backup” has
a narrower scope than ours and only focuses on the border
processes. For example, in the event of the failure of the link
B-C, some of the solutions allow E to still have a route to
B – but none of the existing methods allow internal routers
(e.g., C) to learn a backup route upon a network failure.
Finally, because [3], [2] mainly provide templates instead
of guidelines, the solutions are difficult to generalize and to
apply to networks whose topology does not exactly match
the ones from the provided examples. Large operational
network often comprises more than two routing instances
[10], and in those cases, it is unclear what redistributions
should be enabled and what AD values should be assigned
to the different processes.
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4. PROPOSED GUIDELINES
In this section, we present five new guidelines for config-
uring route redistribution. We present them according to
the properties they provide:
• Safety: The network always converges to an acyclic
routing state.
• Robustness: The route redistributions remain safe in
the event of network failures.
• Reachability: The network always converges to a rout-
ing state where each routing instance that needs to
have a route to the destination has a loop-free and
stable route.
• Domain backup: Reachability is guaranteed despite
link failures, router failures, and network partitions,
as long as a physical path to the destination exists.
4.1 Guideline for safety
Guideline 1 (G-1): For a route that is redistributed through
a sequence of routing instances, its AD value should (i) in-
crease every time the route is redistributed, and (ii) not de-
crease when propagated within a routing instance.
Proposition 4.1: Guideline 1 (G-1) guarantees safety.
Proof sketch. Route redistribution follows a distance-
vector protocol behavior [9]: when a routing instance u re-
distributes a prefix P , it only announces the presence (or
withdrawal) of a route to its direct neighbors (for which RR
is enabled). However, u does not announce the changes re-
lated to P to all the routing instances in the network. Con-
sequently, the routing instances do not have a global view of
the network but only know the next-hop where to forward
the traffic.
[7] introduced a formal framework to study routing proto-
cols, including compositions of routing protocols where for
example, an algebra is used between administrative entities
and a different algebra is used inside of each administrative
entity.
Because RR is a distance-vector protocol used between
routing instances, the application of the metarouting frame-
work [7] highlights that strict monotonicity (SM) is a suf-
ficient condition guaranteeing the correctness of the proto-
col. Strict monotonicity means that the preference of a path
strictly decreases as it is extended [11].
We use the AD associated with each redistributed prefix
to reflect the preference of a route. The AD can well serve
our purposes since in the route selection procedure, the AD
is the first considered criteria and routes with higher AD are
less preferred. Condition (i) ensures that the preferrence of a
route is decreased every time it is redistributed to a routing
instance. However, contrary to traditional distance-vector
protocols where the preference is attached to the route (e.g.,
through the “metric” field in RIP messages), the AD is local
to a router and not propagated in the signaling messages.
Condition (ii) addresses this limitation and makes sure that
the preference of route does not increase when it propagates
within a routing instance. These two conditions ensure that
the preference of the route keeps decreasing as it is redis-
tributed between routing instances and as such, guarantees

















Figure 5: The configuration is robust but does not
guarantee reachability. Routing instance 1 does not
receive a route to the destination
4.2 Guideline for robustness
Guideline 2 (G-2): Configure one unique AD value for
prefix P in all routing processes within each routing instance.
Only redistribute a route to P to a routing instance where
the prefix is configured with a higher AD.
Proposition 4.2: Guideline 2 (G-2) guarantees robustness.
Proof sketch. A configuration compliant with Guide-
line 2 (G-2) is always compliant with Guideline 1 (G-1) in-
dependently of network failures: Since routes are only redis-
tributed to routing processes with higher AD values, condi-
tion (i) is always satisfied, and because all routing processes
of each routing instance present a same AD value, condition
(ii) is also always satisfied.
As such, even in the event of network failures, a configu-
ration compliant with G-2 remains safe.
4.3 Guideline for robustness & reachability
A RR configuration may be robust but may not guaran-
tee rechability. To illustrate it, we assume the network from
Figure 3 and but this time have prefix P originated by rout-
ing instance 3. As depicted in Figure 5, we assume that
two redistributions are configured for this prefix: from B.3
into B.2 and from A.2 into A.1. Consequently, routing in-
stance 2 learns a route to P through B (which redistributes
P from B.3 into B.2). A, which runs 3 routing processes (1,
2, 3), receives two routes to P (from A.3 and A.2). Because
A.3 presents a lower AD values than A.2, A.3 becomes the
selected routing process at A, and A does not redistribute
from 2 into 1. As such, routing instance 1 does not have any
route to P .
Given a network topology with a set of originating rout-
ing instances for prefix P , a set of routing instances requir-
ing reachability to P and a set of redistributing routers, we
seek to determine the redistributions to enable and the AD
values to assign so that the configuration is robust and in
the absence network failures, the routing instances requiring
reachability have a stable route to P .
We define a redistribution path, (u0-r0-u1-r1-...-un-rn), as
a sequence of routing instances (u0, u1, ..., un) and routers
(r0, r1, ..., rn) such that from each of the routing instances
ui, (i ∈ [0,n-1]), redistribution at router ri to the next rout-
ing instance in the sequence ui+1 is configured. The first
routing instance u0 must be an originating routing instance.
For example, in Figure 5, 3-B-2 is a redistribution path.
Guideline 3 (G-3): In addition to complying with G-2, the
4
set of resulting redistribution paths must cover all routing in-
stances that require reachability. A router only redistributes
from its routing process with the lowest AD value.
Proposition 4.3: Guideline 3 (G-3) guarantees robustness
and reachability in the absence of failures.
Proof sketch. A RR configuration compliant with G-3
is compliant with G-2. As such, a RR configuration compli-
ant with G-3 is robust.
The additional conditions provide reachability. First, ac-
cording to the guideline, the redistribution paths cover all
routing instances that require reachability. Consequently,
if each redistribution is active, every routing instance re-
quiring reachability does indeed receive a route. We show
that in the absence of failures, every redistribution is active:
Since every redistributing router r is configured to redis-
tribute from its routing instance u with the lowest AD, if u
has a route, r.u is the selected routing process at r and the
redistributions from r.u are active. As the route propagates
from the originating vertex along the selected redistribution
paths, when a routing instance learns a route, the redistri-
butions from that routing instance become active. As such,
all redistribution paths gradually become active.
For the network in Figure 5 to satisfy G-3, one solution
consists in redistributing not from A.2 into A.1 but from A.3
into A.1. In that case, the redistributions comply with G-
3. Such modification allows every routing instance to have
a route to P . B redistributes from B.3 into B.2, and A
redistributes from A.3 into A.1. All three routing instances
1, 2 and 3 have a route to P .
4.4 Guidelines for robustness, reachability &
domain backup
This section addresses the configuration of RR such that
the redistributions are robust, guarantee reachability and
provide domain backup (i.e., protect against failures such as
link failure, router failure, network partition, etc.).
First, we introduce the deinition of path disjointness: two
redistribution paths P and Q are redistributing-router dis-
joint if for every redistributing router r ∈ P , r /∈ Q. Simi-
larly, two redistribution paths P and Q are routing-instance
disjoint if for every routing instance u ∈ P , u /∈ Q. Finally,
two paths P and Q are disjoint if they are redistributing-
router disjoint and routing-instance disjoint.
Guideline 4 (G-4): In addition to complying with G-3,
configure multiple disjoint redistribution paths to the routing
instances requiring reachability.
Proposition 4.4: Guideline 4 (G-4) guarantees robustness
and reachability even in the event of a failure of a redis-
tributing router or a intermediate routing instance.
Proof sketch. Because complying with G-3, G-4 im-
plies robustness. In addition, with multiple disjoint redistri-
bution paths, a routing instance can still receive a route
through the secondary redistribution path when the pri-
mary one fails. Redistributing-router disjointness guaran-
tees reachability in the event of failure of a redistributing
router, and routing-instance disjointness guarantees reach-
































Figure 6: Example of an enterprise network con-
sisting of 4 routing instances and 5 redistributing
routers. A prefix P is originated by routing instance
1, and all other routing instances are to have a route
to P .
Algorithms from network flow can be applied for identi-
fying the redistribution paths [1].
To protect against the failure of a redistributing router,
edge-disjoint pair algorithms can help identifying two redis-
tributing router disjoint paths. To illustrate it, we consider
the network in Figure 6. We assume that routing instance
3 is critical. Even though the configuration is compliant
with G-3, the failure of A will cause the loss of route at
3. Edge-disjoint pair algorithms can instead highlight two
paths (C-E and A-B) such that if a redistributing router
(e.g., A, B, C or E) fails, routing instance 3 still gets a
route through the secondary path. In that case, E should
redistribute not from 3 to 4 but from 4 to 3, and the AD
values need to be adjusted to be compliant with guideline
G-3 (see Figure 7).
To protect against network partitions, node-disjoint pair
algorithms can identify two routing-instance disjoint paths.
For example, the partition of routing instance 2 (in Fig-
ure 6) into two parts with A on one side and B and D on
the other side, prevents routing instance 3 from receiving a
route. Node-disjoint pair algorithms can identify two redis-
tributions that are resistant to such failures. Redistributing
paths (1, 2, 3) and (1, 4, 3) provide reachability despite the
partition of either routing instance 2 or 4.
In the absence of enough disjointness, additional routers
or routing instances can be added.
It is important to note that G-4 cannot always guarantee
reachability to a routing instance if this same domain gets
partitioned. Considering Figure 6, if the originating instance
1 gets partitioned (with A on one side, and C on the other),
part of the domain may no longer have a route.
To address this limitation, we propose another method
that relies on a functionality implemented by some vendors.
Specifically, the method relies on the ability to set the AD
value of a route based on the tag a route is carrying, i.e.,
the implementation should be able to specify: “if match tag
T, then AD = k” [8].
When such capability is supported, the following guide-
line can be implemented.
Guideline 5 (G-5): Identify a set of redistribution paths































Figure 7: Protection against failures. The
redistributing-router disjoint paths from 1 to 3 al-
lows 3 to still receive a route when A fails. 3 still
receives a route from C-E.
able mutual route redistribution between the instances on
these redistribution paths. Assign a tag to each route, and
increment its value when the route is redistributed. Imple-
ment a policy at all routers to set the AD value of a newly
received route equal to the route’s tag value.
Proposition 4.5: Guideline 5 (G-5) guarantees robustness,
reachability and domain backup.
Proof sketch. The tag essentially carries the prefer-
ence of a route, like the distance metric for RIP. Every time a
route is redistributed, its preference is decreased. However,
the tag field is currently not interpreted as a route prefer-
ence. We solve this problem in two steps: first incrementing
the tag value when redistributing a route, and then setting
the AD value of a newly received route equal to the route’s
tag value at all routers. The approach enforces strict mono-
tonicity (SM) to route redistribution, a sufficient condition
guaranteeing its correctness [7]. Consequently, the redistri-
bution paths do not have to be restricted to pre-selected
paths and RR behaves like a traditional routing protocol,
dynamically discovering the best available path. As such,
G-5 guarantees robustness, reachability and domain backup;
the detailed arguments are provided in [9].
To illustrate how this approach supports domain backup,
we assume that the proposed method is adopted in the net-
work from Figure 7, and routing instance 2 is partitioned
into two parts with A in one and B and D in the other. In
this case, B.2 (respectively, D.2) no longer receives a route.
Instead, B (respectively, D) only receives a route from B.3
(resp., D.3) with a tag value of at least 2 since it is redis-
tributed twice (by C and by E). B (resp., D) increments the
tag value and redistributes the route from B.3 (resp., D.3)
into B.2 (resp., D.2). Consequently, D (resp., B) receives
two routes: one from routing instance 2 – redistributed by
B (resp., D) – and one from routing instance 3. Because
the route from 3 presents a lower tag value and hence AD
value, D (resp., B) maintains D.3 (resp., B.3) as its selected
routing process. The redistributions converge and both par-
titions of 2 have a route to the destination.
5. CONCLUSION
Routing instabilities due to misconfigured route redistri-
bution may be a major problem in enterprise networks as
suggested by the sheer number of vendor documents on how
to avoid such problems. This paper showed that the ven-
dor recommendations do not completely eliminate routing
instabilities and have severe limitations in terms of domain
backup. It then presented a set of new guidelines with prov-
able properties assuring safety, robustness, reachability, and
domain backup.
Several aspects of our guidelines require further research.
First, the AD assignment is subject to existing constraints
not always driven by RR, e.g., the rule of thumb of prefer-
ring internal routes over external ones. It remains to be seen
if there exists a set of unified guidelines for AD assignment
that factors in all known constraints. Second, our guidelines
provide a reasonable starting point for developing tools that
can automatically generate safe and effective RR configura-
tions based on design requirements. One of our long term
research goals is to build and evaluate such tools.
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